Around the Fed : Greenspan's rule by Doug Campbell




“A Taylor Rule and the Greenspan Era.” Yash P. Mehra 
and Brian Minton. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Economic Quarterly, Summer 2007, vol. 93, no. 2, pp. 229-250.
S
tanford University economist John Taylor suggested
what became known as the “Taylor rule” in 1993 as a
means for central banks to control inflation while stabilizing
the economy. In general, the Taylor rule instructs policy-
makers to lean against the wind — to keep interest rates
relatively high when inflation is elevated or employment is
above full, and to set a low target rate when conditions are
reversed. Policymakers take into account the “output gap”
— the difference between actual and full-employment 
output levels — and the difference between actual inflation
relative to the central bank’s target level. Overall, following
the Taylor rule may help the Fed implement policy, insofar 
as its predictability helps generate reasonable public 
expectations about future short-term interest rates.
While Taylor originally proposed the rule as a guide to
policy, he and other economists also established that the rule
neatly summarized actual monetary policy behavior during
the 1980s and 1990s. More recent research suggests that 
policy actions taken by the Federal Reserve under former
Chairman Alan Greenspan followed the Taylor rule but with
“interest rate smoothing” — that is, making changes in the
target federal funds rate in small, cautious, and predictable
movements. Also, some economists have found that 
monetary policy follows a “forward-looking” Taylor rule,
focusing on expected economic developments and  seeking
an equilibrium rate consistent with price stability and 
full employment, and that it focuses on “core” inflation.
(The core inflation measure usually eliminates items like
energy and food products.) 
In a new paper, economists with the Richmond Fed 
generally confirm that monetary policy under Greenspan is
accurately described by the Taylor rule. Further, Yash Mehra
and Brian Minton find empirical support that the
Greenspan Fed’s policy rule “was forward-looking, focused
on core inflation, and smoothed interest rates.” A key 
innovation of their paper is that it uses real-time data 
(the numbers available to policymakers at the time of their
decisions) for economic variables and then checks whether
the results change with final, revised data. Also, the authors
used state-of-the-art forecasts from the Fed’s Greenbook.
The authors do identify a few periods of departure from
the rule, probably due to special macroeconomic develop-
ments. But overall their research suggests that the Taylor
rule “predicts very well the actual path of the federal funds
rate from 1987 to 2000.”
“Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and
Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially.” Dan Ariely,
Anat Bracha, and Stephan Meier. Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston Working Paper No. 07-9, Aug. 27, 2007.
P
articipants in a unique experiment were asked to donate
between a choice of two charities — one perceived by the
donors as “good,” the other as “bad,” and randomly assigned
either public or private settings. In return, some donors
received monetary incentives. The authors set up this experi-
ment to test the notion that, when it comes to prosocial
behavior, people won’t respond very strongly to monetary
incentives in public settings. Individuals seeking social
approval want to signal traits which are generally seen as good
— like charitable giving and volunteering. But if people are
offered a tax break for a donation — and everybody knows
about it — then this may erode the image gain.
Their results bear out this intuition: The “bad” charity
did better when donors operated in private settings, and vice
versa with the “good” charity. “Monetary incentives are more
effective in facilitating private, rather than public, prosocial
activity.” The authors conclude: “People want to be seen as
doing good; without extrinsic incentives, an observer will
attribute the prosocial act to one’s innate good traits which
motivate people to behave prosocially.” A possible policy
implication is that government should expect tax benefits
for items like environmentally friendly water heaters to be
more popular than for hybrid cars — because neighbors can’t
see into people’s basements.
“Economic Theory and Asset Bubbles.” Gadi Barlevy. Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives, Third
Quarter, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 44-59.
T
he author provides a contrarian view on asset bubbles.
Chicago Fed economist Gadi Barlevy says that the
popular press inaccurately terms a “bubble” as a situation in
which the price of an asset has risen so high so fast that it is
susceptible to a collapse. Academics prefer a more rigorous
definition: “a situation where an asset’s price exceeds the
‘fundamental’ value of the asset.” 
Of course, many asset prices do display bubble-like 
tendencies, in both the popular and academic sense. In such
cases, Barlevy warns that meddling with bubbles can be
treacherous. The main reason that bursting a bubble might
be advantageous is because bubbles “divert resources 
from other productive uses.” But pricking a bubble might
aggravate some fundamental inefficiency in the economy,
or make some households worse off.  RF